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In this paper we investigate if the informal sector(IS) can reduce income inequality when 
human capital is applied in the usage of ICT for production in the IS. Utilizing panel data for 
16 Transition countries we demonstrate that when the quality of instutions is low, that there 
is a negative relationship between the size of the IS and the level of income inequality. We 
also show that ICT reduces income inequality and that it causes the IS to have a positive 
effect on the income inequality if investment in ICT is above 1.4% of GDP. We also consider 
implications for policymaking. 
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This paper investigates if the informal sector (IS) contributes to reducing income inequality 
when human capital is applied in the usage of ICT. We perform our analysis on Transition 
countries where these countries are characterised by weak institutions and high income 
inequality. We ask the following questions in this paper: Is the size of informal sector a 
determinant of income inequality in Transition countries? This effect of the IS on inequality 
is altered if we consider human capital applied in the usage of ICT in the IS? 
We attempt to answer the above questions by providing empirical evidence  using four 
different estimates of IS and three proxies of ICT investment. This a relevant point because in 
this literature the reliability of data is always an issue of concern. We show that the results 
strongly depend on employed data.  
High income inequality is a problem in Transition economies and so we show using a 
theoretical model that the IS can reduce income inequality because of  investment in ICT by 
agents with higher levels of human capital from the formal sector (FS) into the IS. The 
application of human capital in the usage of ICT increases productivity in the IS. The 
presence of low quality institutions hampers the productivity of human capital in the FS 
(Fedderke and Luiz, 2002). Consequently, the IS enables agents to augment the fall in their 
incomes in the FS following the decline in the quality of institutions. 
The next section summarizes literature. Section 3 sketches the theoretical hypotheses. 
Sections 4 and 5 introduce the empirical approach and the dataset, respectively. Section 6 






This paper contributes to a growing strength of literature that explains the size of IS as 
consequence of two main factors: income inequality and weak institutions.  
We begin by describing some of the relevant literature explaining the relationship between 
the size of the informal sector and income inequality in Transition countries. The first 
published papers dealing empirically with the relationship between inequality and informality 
within transition economies are Rosser et al. (2000, 2003). They found a strong positive 
relationship between income inequality and the size of the IS. This is because the informal 
sector reduces the amount of tax revenue thereby reducing the effectiveness of government’s 
redistributive policies. According to Rosser et al. (2000), greater income equality might help 
to control the growth of the IS in some Transition economies. The evidence that a large 
informal sector is associated with higher levels of income inequality is also supported by 
Ahmed et al. (2007) using a global data set. Their results also show a strong positive 
relationship between income inequality and the size of IS.  
However, the direction of causation between the size of the informal sector and income 
inequality relationship remains ambigous. The ambiguity that exists in the correlation 
between the informal sector and income inequality is highlighted by Gutierrez-Romero 
(2007) using data from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. These are the two regions 
with the largest IS. She demonstrates that the correlation between the IS and income 
inequality changes sign according to the level of economic development. There is a positive 
correlation of 0.25 between the size of IS and income inequality for developed countries. 
However, there is a negative correlation of -0.14 for developing countries.  
The significance of the quality of institutions as a key determinant of the size of the informal 
sector is shown by Chong and Gradstein (2007). In essence, they argue that in the presence of 
low enforcement of property rights, poor individuals have a limited capacity to extract a 
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larger share of resources. Consequently, individuals prefer to operate in the IS, “where 
although less productive, they are able to fully retain their production output” (Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007, p. 160). 
There has been a wide discussion in many circles about the interaction between human capital 
and ICT. For instance, O’Mahony et al. (2008) discusse how an increase in technology 
increases the demand for skilled labour. Others highlight the role of ICT in developing human 
capital particularly developing countries
1
. An OECD report showed that investment in ICT 
contributed to growth in all OECD countries particularly in the United States which had the 
largest effect
2
. Finally, a firm level study conducted by Statistics Norway showed that the use 
of ICT improves business performance and that the benefits from using ICT increases with the 
skills level of workers
3
. 
From the foregoing, we investigate if this positive effect is relevant also for Transition 
countries. As a consequence of missing values in ICT statistics for European Eastern countries 
we use two alternative proxies: the number of internet users per 100 people and the patent 
applications by patent office divided to country population (in thousand). 
 
III. Theoretical Consideration : Agent–Investor 
Equations (1) and (2) describe the agent’s preferences. Here,  0E  is the expectation operator, 
β is the discount factor,  is the aggregate consumption, that is, the sum of the consumptions 
in the FS (c1t) and the IS (c2t). Assume that goods consumed in the FS and the IS are perfect 
substitutes. Furthermore, assume that U is continuously differentiable and concave such that U 
is increasing in c1t and c2t. 
                                                             
1 Caincross and Pöysti (undated) ICT’s for education and building human capital. 
2 OECD countries for which data was  available including France, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, Italy, Germany, 
Finland, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Canada, U.K, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Australia, Japan and U.S.A. 
3 Statistics Norway (2009). 
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E U C       (1) 
where 0 <  < 1, c1t ≥ 0, and c2t ≥ 0 
                                              
1 2log[ ] t t tC c c      (2) 
 
 Production in the Formal Sector 
Equation (3) represents  production in the FS. A proportion of output/income in the FS is 
produced using human capital. We define human capital in broad terms as ability of a human 
being to “frame knowledge, experience, skill and competency”4. Thus, At is technology, h1t is 
the stock of human capital in the FS, and α is the elasticity of the capital stock. The amount of 
human capital used in production depends on the quality of institutions (q). In this model, the 
higher is q, the lower the quality of the institutions. A higher q reduces the stock of human 
capital available for production in the FS.  
q
ttt hAy
  11      (3) 
with At ≥ 0; h1t ≥ 0; α  0; and 0  q  1,<q 
 Production in the Informal Sector 
Equation (4) represents  production in the IS. Production in the IS also depends on the stock 
of human capital (h2t ). We assume that the stock of human capital used in production in the 
IS is lower than the FS in order to remain hidden from the authorities. Consequently,  is 
smaller than . Following (Renooy, 1990), the IS has limited access to resources such as 
technology and property rights. Consequently, the IS depends on the FS for its supply of 
inputs. Furthermore for simplicity, we assume that all output produced is consumed with the 
IS.  
                                                             
4 “Human Capital and Its Measurement” in 3rd OECD World Forum on “Statistics, Knowledge and Policy” 




tt Ahy 22        (4) 
with At ≥ 0; 0 < h2t < h1t, > 
 The Evolution of Human Capital  
Equation (5) shows that total human capital stock is the sum of human capital in the FS and 
IS respectively. Equation (6) shows that stock of human capital depends on the amount time 
spent in school and ICT. The accumulation of human capital stock through training follows 
from the Lucas model (1988). Furthermore, studies have shown that in the informal sector, 
growth in human capital is mainly acquired through apprenticeships (Blunch et al., 2001).  In 
terms of the link between ICT and human capital: a report by the Kramer et al.(2007) shows 
that ICT contributes to the development of human capital by expanding economic 
opportunities. Zon (2001) develops a theoretical model in which he shows that ICT 
accumulates through the spill-over effects of knowledge. In our paper, the link between ICT 
and human capital is shown by (7) where (1-) proportion of output in the FS is invested in 
ICT.  
ttt hhh 21                                                            (5) 




 1)1(                                    (7) 
The Budget Constraint 
Equations (8) and (9) present the combined budget constraints for the agent in the FS and the 
IS. The left hand side shows that agent’s income and the right hand side shows that this  
income is used to purchase consumption (c1t) and invest in ICT .  
     ttt ICTcy  11                                 (8) 
)1()1( 21121111 LhLhhhcAh ttttt
q
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The model is solved as a recursive competitive equilibrium using the dynamic programming 
approach proposed by Bellman (1957). We now describe this equilibrium according to 
McGrattan et al. (1997). In this model, there are two state variables: technology A, and the 
total human capital stock in both the FS and the IS, ht. The representative agent solves c1t and 
c2t in terms of tomorrow’s human capital stock h1t+1 and h2t+1 and, therefore, chooses the 
level of human capital stock that maximizes utility. The value function in Equation (10) 
solves the agent’s optimization problem: 










    (10) 
Substituting for c1t and c2t from Equations (3) and (9) yields equation (11) below: 













      
(11) 
We follow Busato and Chiarini (2004) and define a dynamic recursive equilibrium as 
consisting of a value function V(At, h1t, h2t), a decision rule (h1t,h2t), and policy functions 
),,( q  such that: 
1. Representative agent/investor maximizes the present value of his discounted 
intertemporal utility as in (11) subject to the budget constraint (10) ; 
2. Government balances its budget in every period; 
3. Market-clearing conditions hold in the IS where goods are not traded; 
4. Market-clearing conditions hold for each market, that is, in the capital, technology, 
consumption, and investment markets; 
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5. Walras’ Law holds6. 
The solution to the maximization problem in equation (11) produces the first-order conditions 
(F.O.Cs) for the capital stocks in the FS and the IS.  
 First-Order Conditions (F.O.C) 
Equations (12) and (13) are the F.O.Cs showing how the agents will choose h1t+1 and h2t+1 
F.O.C wrt h1t+1 
                      )1()(' 11111 LhAqUcEcU qttttt        
 (12) 
F.O.C wrt h2t+1 
                               )1(' 11211 LhAUcEcU ttttt                                            (13) 
Steady-State Solutions 
The F.O.Cs are used to derive the steady-state solutions to the stocks of human capital in the 
























































h ss      (15) 
From equations (14) and (15), we can compute the steady-state solutions to output in the FS 
and the IS shown below: 
                                                             
6 This implies that any excess demand in one sector has to be balanced by an excess supply in another sector. 


























































Ay ss        (17) 
Comparative Statics 
We use comparative statics to examine the impact of a decline in the quality of institutions on 
the size of the informal sector as well as income inequality. Let I  be defined as the relative 
size of the IS in the steady-state such that  








2                                     (18) 
We measure the level of income inequality (z) as the difference between steady-state income 
in the FS and IS as shown in (19). A positive result implies an increase in income inequality 
and vice versa.  
                                                    ssss yyz 21                                                       (19) 
Equation (20) shows the total derivative of I with reference to q.  Given the magnitude of the 
parameters, a decline in the quality of institutions (an increase in q) increases the relative size 
of IS. Our result conforms to the wider literature that weak institutions are associated with a 
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where: 0  α < 1; 0  L < 1 ; 0  q < 1; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1; > ; q >  . 
Equation (21) shows how we compute the impact of an decrease in instititional quality on 
income inequality. This provides the argument for our main testable hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I: Ceteris Paribus, an increase in institutional quality reduces income inequality. 
An increase in q reduces the marginal returns to productivity in the FS relative to the IS. 
Consequently, the agent allocates more human capital and invests more ICT towards 






































































































































IV. Empirical model 
We use a panel regression to examine the effect of the size of the IS, ICT , human capital and 
institutional quality on income inequality. Caroli and Van Reenen (1999) and Breshnahan et 
al. (2002) have shown that at the firm level,  differences in skills are important for the usage 
of ICT. In order to show that ICT affects the level of human skills, we include an interaction 
term between L and ICT. Furthermore, we add an interaction term between IS and ICT. This 
is to examine if ICT enables the IS to affect income inequality. The empirical model is shown 
below in (22): 
        1 2 3 4 5 6( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( * ) ( * )it i it it it it it it it it itGINI a IS a ICT a L a q a IS ICT a L ICT      (22) 
The empirical model is estimated for sixteen transition countries from 1990 to 2001, 1990-
2004 and 1999-2007 according to availability of the IS estimates. GINI is the Gini coefficient 
which is used as a measure of income inequality, IS is the size of the informal sector, ICT is 
Information and Communication Technology (both hardware and software) or one of his 
proxies, assuming that a proxy of human capital stock is the time spent in school, L refers to 
the gross enrolment rate to the secondary school, q is an index of institutional quality
7
, λi 
captures cross-section specific effects (fixed or random) and ε comprises measurement errors 
and country specific shocks which is assumed to be white noise. 
The expected signs of coefficients based on exiting literature are:   1 3 40,  0,  0.a a a  For 
the parameters 2a , 5a  and 6a  different hypotheses can hold. On the one hand, we expect a 
negative relationship as an increase in ICT should lead to a negative relationship between the 
IS and human capital respectively on income inequality. This is because when q is low then 
the IS can benefits from ICT as the agents in the formal sector transfer ICT and human skills 
for production in the IS. On the other hand, the sign of these parameters could be positive. An 
                                                             
7
 High q = low quality and low q = high quality. 
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increase in ICT could cause a positive relationship between the IS and human capital since 
the IS have limited capacity to access to ICT. An increase in ICT increases the differences in 
skill between the formal and informal sector respectively. Therefore it could be argued that 
an increase in ICT leads to a positive relationship between human capital and income 
inequality. 
 
V. Data source and variables 
This section explains the sources of the data used to measure the variables described in 
section 4.  For the analysis, we have constructed a panel of annual data from 1990 to 2007 for 
16 Transition countries
8
. To improve the reliability of the econometric exercise we use 
different proxy measures for the same variables. In our view, this may increase the robustness 
of the estimates across measurement errors. The panel data consists of eleven variables which 
we describe in turn below. 
The income inequality (GINI) is measured by Gini’s index of income distribution. The data 
are retrieved form the TransMONEE
9
.  
One of the most important issues in the empirical literature on informal sector is about the 
reliability of its estimates. The IS is characterised by a myriad of definitions
10
 and a variety of 
methods have been developed to estimate the IS. However these methods produce wide 
                                                             
8 Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine.  
9 Data downloaded from: http://www.transmonee.org/. Table 10.9 Distribution of income: Gini coefficient. 
TransMONEE 2012 Database. 
10 According with the definition of Informal Sector in Transition Economies adopted by the World Bank- 
Europe and Central Asia, the IS covers a wide range of labour market activities that combine two groups of 
different nature. On the one hand, the IS is formed by the coping behaviour of individuals and families in 
economic environment where earning opportunities are scarce (survival activities e.g. casual jobs, temporary 
jobs, unpaid jobs, multiple job holding etc.). On the other hand, the IS is a product of rational behaviour of 
entrepreneurs that desire to escape state regulations (e.g. tax evasion, avoidance of labour regulation and other 




variations in estimates of IS.  We attempt to control for this issue by applying four alternative 
measures of IS reported by Feige and Urban (2008) and Buehn and Schneider (2012). 
According to Feige and Urban, the relationships between recorded, unrecorded, observed and 
unobserved income may be described as: Y = total economic activity; YR = recorded 
economic activity (measured output; GDP); YRO = recorded observed economic activity; YIUI 
= recorded unobserved economic activity [measured (imputed) Non Observed Economy]; 
YUR = unrecorded activity. Given the foregoing definitions, the total economic activity (Y) 
and the total unobserved and imputed unobserved component (YTUI) are:  
Y = YRO+YIUI +YUR  and YTUI = YRO + YIUI.  
With this classification, we extract from Feige and Urban (2008), the estimates of YTUI  
obtained by the currency approach (Informal sector currency) and by the modified electric 
consumption (Informal sector electricity)
11
 and YIUI based on authors’ inquiry to the national 
statistical agencies of the Transition countries on the amount of non-observed economy 
(NOE) already included in the official NIPA estimates of GDP. Feige and Urban (2008) 
contacted directly the national agencies to enlarge the time span of the NOE imputations in 
national accounts covered in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (United 
Nations, 2003). We label these estimates reported in Feige and Urban (2008 - Table 1, p. 292) 
as “Informal sector by UN”. With reference of Buehn and Schneider (2012 - Table 3, pp.160-
161), they estimate the shadow economy as percentage of GDP by MIMIC approach 
(informal sector by MIMIC) over the period 1999-2007. 
                                                             
11
 Data are provided from 1990 to 2001. 
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Romania 16.24 15.70 16.37 32.59 
Poland 16.52 7.46 15.45 27.20 
Hungary 17.30 29.09 16.00 24.41 
Bulgaria 18.41 21.89 19.33 35.30 
Slovak Republic 19.25 12.53 14.23 18.13 
Czech Republic 20.36 17.76 5.10 18.37 
Estonia 21.75 15.50 7.03 31.18 
Russian Federation 23.33 25.82 12.07 43.80 
Latvia 25.70 14.43 16.40 29.21 
Slovenia 28.02 23.25 6.34 26.23 
Ukraine 29.02 27.51 20.00 49.72 
Belarus 29.88 23.59 10.35 46.41 
Lithuania 30.91 22.66 19.18 32.04 
Macedonia 38.15 32.01 14.77 37.64 
Kazakhstan 44.16 24.73 28.82 41.14 
Moldova 45.78 35.39 30.52 44.45 
Average 26.55 21.83 15.02 33.56 
Observations 192 192 115 142 
Time period 1990-2001 1990-2001 1990-2004 1999-2007 
 
Concerning Information and Communication Technology, we calculate the ratio between 
investment in telecoms with private participation and the GDP. Furthermore, we consider as 
proxy of ICT the number of Internet users per 100 people and the ratio between patent 
applications by patent office, broken down by resident and non-resident, and the population 
(in thousand). These two alternative variables have the important characteristic to have less 
missing values than the ratio between investment in telecoms with private participation and 
the GDP. In particular ICT, Internet users per 100 people and the ratio between patent 
applications and the population count for 70%, 19% and 15% of missing values for the period 
1990-2001 and 50%, 2% and 6% of the missing values over the range 1999-2007. 
With reference to years of education (L), we include a measure of gross enrolment rate to the 
secondary school. This variable is defined as the number of pupils enrolled in secondary, 
regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for 
secondary education. In particular, secondary education is provided at high schools, teacher-
15 
 
training schools at this level, and schools of a vocational or technical nature. The population 
of the age group that officially corresponds to the secondary level of education generally 
begins between 13 and 15 years of age and finishes between 17 and 18 years of age. Data on 
ICT and education are retrieved from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, release 
2012). 
For the indicator of institutional quality (q), we calculate an index based on the average of 
eight of the fourteen indexes published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) transition indicators (Index of Transition)
12
. The (EBRD) index of 
Transition is the arithmetic average for each country of the following indicators: small scale 
privatisation, enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and forex 
system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalisation, securities markets 
and non-bank financial institutions, overall infrastructure reform. The original measurement 
scale for the EBRD indicators ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 represents little or no change from 
a rigid centrally planned economy and 4 represents the standards of an industrialised market 
economy. To fit with our definition of q adopted in the theoretical model, the original index is 
rescaled to have that a high q for low institutional quality and low q for high quality of 
institutional context. Therefore the rescaled index is equal to the maximum value (three) if 
                                                             
12 In appendix A we also use an alternative index of institutional quality: the Index of Economic Freedom 
published by The Wall street Journal and The Heritage Foundation. “A comprehensive definition of economic 
freedom should encompass all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and 
services. The highest form of economic freedom should provide an absolute right of property ownership; fully 
realized freedoms of movement for labour, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint 
of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.” Index of 
Economic Freedom (2009, p. 10). Data downloaded from: http://www.heritage.org/index/. 
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the country has a rigid centrally planned economy while the minimum (zero) indicates a 




VI. Empirical Results 
We utilize a panel analysis approach, where alternative estimators of panel equation would be 
suitable for this analysis. The Hausman (1978) test is applied to assist in making the decision 
between fixed effect and random effect approaches. It implies the nonexistence of a 
significant correlation between country specific effects and explanatory variables. We find 
that the Hausman test frequently gives more support to fixed effect than to random effect 
model. We also perform the Redundant Fixed effects test to decide on the relevance of pooled 
versus fixed effects regressions. According with the redundant fixed effects, three restricted 
specifications are estimated. The first set consists of two tests that evaluate the joint 
significance of the cross-section effects using sums-of-squares (F-test) and the likelihood 
function (Chi-square test). The corresponding restricted specification is one in which there 
are period effects only, the remaining specifications evaluate the joint significance of the 
period effects, and of all of the effects, respectively. All of the results suggest that the cross 
sections effects are statistically significant.  
Unfortunately both residuals with random and fixed panel specification often exhibit serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity
14
. According with these outputs, we apply a feasible GLS 
                                                             
13 In appendix A the rescaled version of the Index of Economic Freedom is calculated by the following formula: 
qit=1-(Index of Economic Freedomit/100). Therefore qit it is graded using a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 
the minimum freedom. 
14 It is well known that random effect methods fail to provide consistent estimators for the foregoing dynamic 
panel data (DPD) model. To the opposite Instrumental and GMM first-differenced estimators, like the well-used 
Arellano and Bond (1991), have appealing properties for N large, being consistent and also asymptotically 
efficient. Unfortunately, the finite-sample performance of GMM-DPD estimators turns out to be very poor when 
the cross-sectional dimension is small, as demonstrated in a number of Monte Carlo experiments (Kiviet, 1995; 
Judson and Owen, 1999; Bruno, 2005), which makes the Arellano and Bond estimator as well as other GMM 
estimators unfeasible in our case. 
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specification with fixed effect (FEGLS) model using cross section weights and “Cross-
Section SUR” method to correct standard errors and covariance. The FEGLS estimator with 
cross-section weights controls for a different residual variance for each cross section while, 
the Cross-section SUR method handles cross-section correlation (period clustering). The 
latter method is a variant of the so-called Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) 
methodology proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). 
Table 2 reports the results of eq. (22). FEGLS take into account both unobserved countries-
specific effects (λi) and for a different residual variance for each cross-section. LSDVs 
include only country fixed effects (λi) but not GLS weights. For both FEGLS and LSDV we 
do not report the dummies for the sake of brevity. The numbers in parenthesis are the t-ratios. 
In both FEGLS and LSDV models, the Jarque-Bera tests often reveal that kurtosis and 
skewness of distribution of the error-term are often not normal. As a result, we have also 
performed a set of robustness checks of the estimates in appendix. The estimates reported in 
the appendix A are obtained by Dynamic-LSDV, LSDV, FEGLS and Random-GLS. They 




TABLE 2. Dependent Variable: Gini Index of Income Distribution 
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Observ./ Cross-sect.  32/8 88/14 103/14 32/8 88/14 99/16 23/7 63/14 68/14 48/9 82/15 80/15 
Periods  1991-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1991-2001 1990-2001 1990-2001 1992-2001 1992-2004 1992-2004 1999-2007 1999-2007 1999-2007 
R2-adjusted  0.744 0.936 0.911 0.783 0.941 0.909 0.885 0.906 0.861 0.945 0.895 0.900 
F-test (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson  2.056 1.852 1.641 2.006 1.883 1.529 1.706 1.525 2.276 1.643 1.556 1.363 
Note: ***, **, *Denote significant at 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. For FEGLS are used cross-section weights. Standard Errors are corrected with cross-section SUR method.
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Table 3 summarizes the signs of estimated coefficients according with the estimation method 
of the IS based on the currency, electricity, national accounting and MIMIC approach. 
Institutional quality and index of patent per capita produce the most robust results in terms of 
negative correlation with income inequality. At the contrary, the signs and statistical 
significance of the other regressors are not robust to change the source of data. 
 
TABLE 3. Summary results - dependent variable: Gini Index 
 








Informal sector 1a  < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0 
ICT/GDP 2a  = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 
Internet user per 100 people 2a  < 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 
Patent per capita 2a  < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
School Enrolment (secondary) 3a  = 0 = 0 > 0 < 0 
Index of Transition 4a  < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
Proxy ICT * Informal Sector a5 = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 
Proxy ICT * School Enrolment a6 > 0 > 0 > 0 > ,< 0 
 
These results highlight the problem of measuring the relative size of the informal sector 
which is a hidden entity. The variety of methods used in measuring the size of IS generates 
substantial variation in the size of the estimates. These differences show that the relationship 
between the size of IS and income inequality is undetermined and it should be interpreted 
with caution. These discrepancies in the signs of coefficients underscore the inherent 
problems of using estimates of the IS in empirical analysis as highlighted in Ahmed et al. 
(2007). 
Table 3 shows that ICT investment as percentage of GDP is for the most part of regressions 
positively related to income inequality. The number of internet users per 100 people was also 
used as an alternative measure of ICT and it is not statistically significant at 5% level. At the 
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contrary, we find that an increase in the number of patents per capita is correlated with an 
increase in income inequality.  
The coefficient of secondary school enrolment has ambiguous sign. We motivate this 
(unexpected) result considering that, the stock of human capital inherited from the socialist 
period was high by the standard of other countries at similar levels of economic development. 
According to Micklewright (1999) in a number of Central and Eastern European countries, 
and in the Baltics, enrolment rates in general secondary schools followed different trends. 
Substantial increases have taken place in Romania, Poland and Latvia. However, general 
secondary enrolment rates are more or less unchanged in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and 
have deteriorated notably in countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia for which data are 
available. Thus this complex picture makes difficult to find common trend in education 
statistics among Transition countries. In this sense, to find (expected) negative sign only for 
the regressions analysed over the period 1999-2007 (i.e. when the estimates of the IS are 
provided by the MIMIC approach) is not surprising. In the latter period the switch from 
socialist to post-communist educational system was at an advanced stage, thus educational 
official statistics are more reliable and comparable than in the previous years.   
Concerning the index of institutional quality (e.g. Index of Transition), it is significant and 
with the expected negative sign (i.e. hypothesis I). In line with a priori expectation 
institutional infrastructure has an important effect on income inequality. 
Concerning the interaction terms, the sign of 5a  remains ambiguous. The sign is negative and 
significant when the number of internet users per 100 people is used as a proxy for ICT 
investment. The negative sign of 5a  reveals that the IS benefits from using ICT and this 
contributes to reducing income inequality. However, this interaction term is always 
statistically not significant when IS is estimated by currency approach.  
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The interaction term 6a  is undetermined. For the most part of estimated regressions it is 
positive but it became negative if ICT investment interacts with gross enrolment rate to the 
secondary school. However is quite robust the result that a positive interaction between the 
number of patents per capita and human capital increases income inequality.  
In summary, we find no clear relation between IS and ICT, which is interesting in that it goes 
against most of the existing literature. Unambiguous results are only when the higher the 
patent application per capita is used as proxy of ICT investment and the index of transition 
reforms. For both the variables higher is the patent application per capita and the quality of 
institutional infrastructure, the lower will be income inequality in Transition countries.  
The following question: Why do estimates of the IS using different methods show different 
statistical relationships? We view the differences in the results of the relationship between the 
IS and income inequality as a spillover of the ongoing debate on the derivation of the IS 
estimates themselves. While a large literature exists on the shortcomings of some of these 
methods
15
, here we highlight on the weaknesses of the IS estimates based on the National 
Income and Product Account (NIPA) procedures. These procedures aim to produce 
exhaustive measures of Gross Domestic Product that includes accounting for the Non-
Observed Economy (NOE). The measurement of the NOE is based on trying to account for 
missing data as a result of underground activities, illegal activities, informal sector (involves 
the production of  legitimate goods and services that do not pass through formal channels), 
household production and deficiencies in data collection). Feige and Urban (2008) refer to 
these estimates as “Imputed Unobserved Income” (IUI). With respect to the transition 
countries, some of the information used in the construction of IS estimates used by the UN 
are derived from statistics compiled by national agencies. Feige and Urban (2008) argue that 
                                                             




during the transition period, there was a major change in statistical practice from the Material 
Product System (MPS) to the System of National Accounts (SNA). The process of this 
change could have potentially been affected by political manipulation. This in addition to the 
presence of a substantial unobserved economy would have undermined the accuracy of 
statistics from these national agencies. Consequently there could be an understating or 
overstating of estimates of the IS based on the NIPA procedures. Feige and Urban (2008) find 
various degrees of divergence between estimates of IS based on macro models such as the 
currency method and the latter. The differences between these estimates points to the fact that 
exhaustive of IS estimates based on NIPA procedures should not necessarily decrease the 
reliance of IS estimates based on macro models. In this paper, we concur with most of the 
literature that all estimates of IS should be interpreted with caution. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
This paper examined if the IS affects income inequality in countries where the level of 
institutional quality is low.  
The empirical analysis is based on a panel regression based on  16 Transition countries 
between 1990 to 2007. We showed  the effect of IS on income inequality when the quality of 
institutions is low depends on the limited reliability of IS data. This result reveals as existing 
literature on this relationship to be interpreted with caution as it is sensitive to the method of 
estimating of IS. In particular we find that estimates of the “Informal sector by UN” and by 
MIMIC approach show a positive relationship with income inequality. The result of the latter 
concurs with most of the empirical literature. At the contrary, a negative/insignificant 
relationship between IS estimates based on currency and physical input method and Gini 
index is estimated.  
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We interpret this ambiguous finding as a further evidence of the problems of working with 
estimates of the IS in terms of their reliability. Our results concur with the conclusions of 
Ahmed et al. (2007) and Dell’Anno and Piirisild (2007) that no method of estimating of the 
IS can be considered as a robust measure. As a caveat, we urge caution in the use of these 
results for policy recommendations as it does strongly support the role of ICT in the IS.  
On the positive side, our study has highlighted the complementarities between education and 
ICT.  The significance of the interaction term shows that  policies should be directed towards 
education that supports the development of building high level of ICT skills. 
With reference to the relationship between IS and ICT. We assume that the IS is unable to 
adopt of ICT as it involves a huge cost. Consequently, its access to ICT is mainly through the 
FS. Therefore, polices aimed at increasing access to ICT would reduce the productivity gap 
between the formal and informal sectors respectively.  
In conclusion, ICT cannot be seen as a panacea but rather a vital element when a country 
develops the right fundamentals coupled with strong institutions and well functioning 
markets. Parham et al. (2001) showed based on studies in Australia that “ICT driven growth” 
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Appendix A: Estimates with alternative estimators and specifications 
Note: ***, **, *Denote significant at 1, 5 and 10 level, respectively. For FEGLS are used cross-section weights. Standard Errors are corrected with cross-section SUR method. 
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Obs./ Cross-sect.  25/7 88/14 103/14 32/8 88/14 58/13 32/8 88/14 56/13 51/13 68/14 51/13 61/12 80/15 82/15 
Periods  ‘91-‘01 ‘90-‘01 ‘90-‘01 ‘91-‘01 ‘91-‘01 ‘95-‘01 ‘91-‘01 ‘90-‘01 ‘93-‘04 ‘95-‘04 92-‘04 ‘95-‘04 ‘00-‘07 ‘99-‘07 ‘99-‘07 
R2-adjusted  0.896 0.936 0.911 0.564 0.884 0.895 0.783 0.634 0.913 0.935 0.861 0.293 0.929 0.900 0.102 
F-test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.028 
Durbin-Watson  4.070 1.852 1.641 1.718 2.343 1.249 2.006 0.948 1.839 1.662 1.276 1.049 1.857 1.363 1.350 
Cross-sect. Eff.  Fixed Fixed Fixed Rand. Fixed Fixed Fixed Rand. Fixed Fixed Fixed Rand. Fixed Fixed Rand 
